

Question 1

(10 points)

Prove the converse of the deduction theorem: If $B_1, \dots, B_{k-1} \vdash (B_k \supset C)$,
then $B_1, \dots, B_{k-1}, B_k \vdash C$.

Prove: If $\vdash (B_k \supset C)$ then $B_k \vdash C$.

(1) $\vdash (B_k \supset C)$ assumption

(2) $B_k \vdash (B_k \supset C)$ b/c any proof from axioms & B_k
is also a proof from axioms

$$(3) \quad B_k \vdash B_k$$

and hypotheses. ["monotonicity
of the propositional
calculus"]
hypothesis

$$(4) \quad B_k \vdash C$$

modus ponens on (2), (3)

(30 points) (This is exercise 3 in Schöning.) A formula G is called a (logical) consequence of set of formulas $\{F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k\}$ if for every assignment \mathcal{A} that is suitable for each of F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k and G it follows that, whenever \mathcal{A} is a model for F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k , then it is also a model for G . (This is indicated $F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k \models G$ or $\mathcal{A} \models G$.)

Show that the following assertions are equivalent:

1. G is a logical consequence of F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k .

2. $((\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) \rightarrow G)$ is a tautology.

3. $((\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) \rightarrow G)$ is unsatisfiable.

(Hint: Prove $1 \rightarrow 2$, $\neg 3 \rightarrow \neg 2$, and $3 \rightarrow 1$.)

(recall: this part was not graded)
error in unibsterm

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$1 \rightarrow 2$, Consider a suitable assignment (i.e., a suitable interpretation) of F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k that is not a model of F_1, \dots, F_k . Then at least one of F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k , say F_i , is false in \mathcal{A} , i.e., $\mathcal{A}(F_i) = 0$. Therefore,

$a(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) = 0$. Therefore $a(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G) = 1$.

Now, consider a suitable assignment a of F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k

that is a model of F_1, F_2, \dots, F_k . Then, $a(F_i)$ is

true for every $1 \leq i \leq k$. Therefore $a(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) = 1$.

But, since G is a logical consequence of F_1, \dots, F_k ,

$a(G) = 1$. So, $a(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G) = 1$.

$\neg 3 \rightarrow \neg 2$

Let \mathcal{A} be a suitable assignment of $\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow \neg G$ that is a model of it, i.e., $\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow \neg G) = 1$.

Then, either (i) $\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) = 0$, and therefore

$$\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G) = 1, \text{ or}$$

(ii) $\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) = 1$ and $\mathcal{A}(\neg G) = 1$, and

therefore $\mathcal{A}(G) = 0$, and therefore

$$\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G) = 0$$

2 \rightarrow 3

Assuming $\neg 3$

For every suitable assignment α for which

$$\alpha\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i\right) = 1, \text{ then } \alpha(\neg G) = 1.$$

Then, $\alpha(G) = 0$. Therefore,

$$\alpha\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G\right) = 0$$

For every suitable assignment α for which

$$\alpha\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i\right) = 0, \text{ then } \alpha\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G\right) = 1.$$

$\neg 3 \rightarrow \neg 2$

Let \mathcal{A} be a suitable assignment of $\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \wedge \neg G$ that is a model. Then,

$$\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \wedge \neg G) = 1, \text{ so } \mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i) = 1 \text{ and}$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k \neg G) = 1, \text{ so } \mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k G) = 0, \text{ so}$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G) = 0, \text{ and therefore}$$

$\bigwedge_{i=1}^k F_i \rightarrow G$ is not a tautology.

3 \rightarrow 1

Assume \mathcal{A} is a model of $\bigwedge_{i=1}^k f_i$. Then, by (3),

$\mathcal{A}(\neg G) = 0$, so $\mathcal{A}(G) = 1$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A}

is a model of each of the f_i , then

\mathcal{A} is a model of G .

Question 2(c).

Consider $\text{KB} \cup \{ \neg g \}$. Run the marking algorithm.

g is not marked. Therefore, in the minimal

model of KB , g could be false. Therefore,
there exists a model of KB in which g is
false. Therefore, g does not logically follow
from KB .